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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

I

STATE OF UTAH
l·:l'l;]·~\'E \YILLIAMS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
- vs. :,1\\ noTllEY, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

10846

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

~IA'l'E~lENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages
for pi_· rsonal injuries allegedly sustained by him in a
1·a11 through an open trap door on defendants' premises.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff,
no eause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affinnance of the judgment
below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief, we refer to the parties as they appeared
ill the court below. The record on appeal is not numbered
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as pn·scribed by the rules. Hather than munlwri 11 g ('<1t·lt
page separately, the clerk numbered ead1 docutm·nt :o;e 11 _
arately. 1'herefore, in referring to the record, we ~hall
refer to the record page number and, if the <locurn(·nt
has more than one page, to the page of the docm 11 ("ll:
(e.g. a refen nce to page 2 of plaintiff's complaint wili
he shown as R. 1, p. 2) The transcript of the trial pr1Jceedings is numbered separately. Therefore, in n·feni 11 ~
to the transcript, we shall use the de8ignation "T".
1

The statement of facts contained in plaintiff;,; Lri1·1
is not complete, and we deem it necessary to re-state th··
facts completely in order that the court may haw ;i
proper understanding of the background out of which
this case arises.
Defendants, husband and wife, operate a restaurant
and dining room bu8iness located on vVashington Boulevard in Ogden. ( T. 16) The place of business is located
on the west side of Washington Boulevard, facing easterly. (Ex:. 1, T. lG, 17) The premises consist of a restaurant facility in the front or easterly portion, in which
counter service and booth service is available; two dining
rooms in the rear or \vesterly portion of the building:
with kitchen facilities between the restaurant portion
and the dining room portion. (Ex. 1) At the time or'
the accident here in question, there was a parking lot
for patrons at the rear or west of the premises and l!
driveway giving access thereto leading off ·washington
Boulevard and along the south side of the building.
There were sidewalk entrances to the front portion of
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tll\' l'l'~taurant, but access to the dining rooms was obta1rwd primarily through an entryway and vestibule on
tlw ;-;outh side of the building approximately in the
111id<lk (Bx. 1, T. 41, -1:2) This entryway gave conven,,·nt access to both dining rooms, known as the Valley
i-'orgP l~oom and Fort Pitt Room, to restrooms for both

mt·n and women, and, if desired, to the restaurant fa-

··dit it•s in the front of the building. ( T. 20) The men's
1 p;.;trooltl \\·as loeated near the entryway to the kitchen
and ju:.st off the vestibule leading to the various dining
room::;. (Ex. 1, T. 17-20, 43-44)
Along the north side of the building was a service
t:orridor leading from the kitchen to the Valley Forge
Hoom. (T. 19-20, Ex. 1) This corridor was for the use
of waitresses and other employees in serving food from
thP kitchen to the dining rooms and in returning soiled
llishes, etc. It was not designed or intended for the use
of patrons, since it would require them to pass through
the entire kitchen facilities in order to reach the dining
room. (Ex. 1, T. 138, 148)
The kitchen was at all times well lighted. (T. 37, 46,
73) The dining room at the opposite end of the corridor
\ra::; abo lighted, and there was an overhead fluorescent
light in this corridor in the portion near the kitchen.
(Ex. 1, T. 2±) Underneath this light there was a stairwell leading to a storage room where defendants kept
canned goods, dry vegetables, bottled beverages, etc.
(T. 24, 197, Ex. 1) Acces·s to the storage area was
ohtai1wd by opening a trap door and descending by a
stairwav. (Ex. 1, T. 25)

At either end of the corridor was a colon•<l \ l'\·d
or orange) light. ( T. 21, 181, 182, 192, Ex. 1) 'rhe trap
door was so arranged that upon being opened, the ligfo,
at either end would start blinking. (T. 182) lt was ab"
the practice of defendants when the trap door wa,
opened, to erect a plywood partition to the west 01
dining room side of the trap door, completely bloekint;
the corridor, and indicating to employees that the tra 11
door was open. (T. 21) Over the dining room entrane\' t1J
the corridor was a sign which read '"Employees Unh·".
(T. 22, 183, Ex. 1) There was also such a sign oYer th1·
blinking light at the dining room enhance to the eorrid(Jr.
(Ex. 1, 2; T. 22, 183)
On the evening of April 4, 1963, the local J ayeet·.'
\Vere having a banquet and election meeting in the Yallt>y
Forge Room. (T. 31, 50) One of the Jaycees had
arranged with plaintiff's employer to furnish a keg of
beer, and this was delivered to the premises by plaintiff
at about 5 :30 P.M. on that date. ( T. 55) Plaintiff returned later in the evening to check whether the gas
pressure was sufficient to maintain the flow of beer.
(T. 58, 61) According to his version of the matter, the
usual entryway to the dining room was obstructed hy
activities of the meeting within. (T. 60) He, therefort>,
proceeded through the kitchen, down the service corridor, and into the dining room. The evidence shows
without dispute that at this time, he had a conversation
with Martha Lynch, a kitchen employee of defendanb.
The exact words of the conversation could not, of course.
be precisely established, but, admittedly, she gave warn-
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hiw that there was a trap <lour that either "would"
<>l' "rniµ;ht" be up or open when he returned. 8he did not
111u1t·atl- to him specifieally where the trap door was,
11:11 it \\US in<lieated to him, and understood by him,
1.11a1 it ,,·us in the corridor. (rr. OU, 6:2, 63, 73, 76, 77,
:ng t()

HU, HJ)

l'lamtiff had a glass of beer with one of the Jaycees,
\ tkl'.i\.ed the keg, and then attempted to leave via the
~1·1·yi . ·e (~orridor and kitchen. Cl'. 61) When he entered
1 iw l'.Orndor, he encountered a plywood board obstructing
1J1l· passageway. He picked it up, made about a half
-t1·p or turn, and immediately fell into the storage area
hvlu\\·, eanying the plywood board with him. ( T. 61,

'4,

82)

Two employees of defendants testified that follow:ng tlw aecident, plaintiff said he felt foolish for having
1a1lvn in the trap door after having been warned about
'b presence. ( T. 138, 18±) This testimony was not reln1tted by plaintiff or by any witnesses on his behalf.
Plaintiff commenced action against the defendants
11\· t·omplaint filed June 22, 1964. (R. 1, p. 1) In his
l'.Olllplaint, plaintiff alleged as grounds for recovery var111ns itt>1w; of claimed negligence, namely: (a) failing
tu loek the entrance door while the trap door was open;
1 Li) failing to provide an adequate barricade around the
trap door; ( c) failing to give indication to the plaintiff
,J! thP location and danger created by the trap door; and
1d1 failing to elose the trap door after use by defendants'
<tµ-Pnts. ( U. 1, p. :2) By their answer, defendants denied

6

negligence on their own part, (R. 3, pp. 1, 2) and as an
affirmative defem;e alleged that the accident was uiu~\·d
solely by the negligence of plaintiff, or that plaintitr
was guilty of contributory negligence. (R. 3, p. ~) Di~
covery proceedings were conducted by both partiel:l and
on K ovember 15, 1965, the case came on for pretrial
before Judge Cowley. At the pretrial, plaintiff daiiued
the same grounds of negligence as alleged in hi:; corn.
plaint, and further claimed that the trap door wa:s a
nuisance. (R. 15, p. 2) Defendants again denied an;
negligence and re-asserted plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense. (R. 15, p. 2) The concluding paragraph of the pretrial order provided as follows:
"IT 18 FlJRTHER ORDERED that no amendments be permitted to the pleadings heretofon·
filed or to this Pre-trial Order except fur good
cause shown and to prevent manifest injustice."
(Emphasis ours) (R. 15, p. 3)
The pretrial order was prepared by counsel for the plaintiff at the direction of the court. (R. 14)
On these issues, the case came regularly on for
trial before Judge Cowley on December 13, 1966. (R. 1~.
T. 4) All evidence offered by plaintiff and unobjeeted
to by defendants was relevant to the issues as defined in
the pleadings and pretrial order. At the conclusion ol
plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff's attorney, for the fir~t
time in the case, moved to amend the complaint and
the pretrial order to allege as an additional theory of
recoverv that defendants were guilty of wilful misconduct. ( 177, 178) The motion was resisted by defend-

T.
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;int:-

grounds: first, that there was no evidence
JH th,• n·t·ord which would support a finding of wilful
'111H·o11Juct; and secondly, that the motion was untimely
l ill·(L On both grounds, the motion was denied. ( T. 178)
'i'lll' rnotion was renewed at the end of all of the evidence
and, again, denied on the same grounds. (T. 202)
011

tl1t~

Although defendants had contended that plaintiff
\Ya~ a tres1>asser or, at best, only a licensee as to the
tiortio11 of the premises on which the accident occurred,
the· court held as a matter of law that he was in the
,tatus of a business invitee, and that defendants owed
l.J lum ::;uch duty of care as would be owed to any busiJl(•:-:.-: invitee. (R. 23, pp. 7, 8) The case, therefore, was
~nl1111itted to the jury on the issues of defendants' negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence, (R. 23)
<lllJ after due deliberation, the jury returned with its
gPill'rnl verdict in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action. (R. 24, T. 209)
Plaintiff's sole ground of appeal is that the court
dl·nied his motion for leave to aniend and to include
as an additional ground of recovery alleged wilful miscondud on the part of defendants.

ARGUMENT

1'hl' trial judge denied plaintiff's motion for leave
to amend both on the grounds that there was no sufficient
evidence to warrant submission of the issue to the jury,
and on the ground that it was untimely made. If the
judge was correct on either ground, the judgment below
111ust be affinned.

8
POINT I
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
WARRANT THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF
THE ISSUE OF WILFUL l\IISCONDUCT.
Plaintiff contends that the jury could have found

that defendant::::; were guilty of wilful mi::::;conduct in 11iarn
taining "an unguarded trap door opening" "in an unli:.
passageway" and that plaintiff could '"see no ::::;ig-n~ ur
warning devices,'' and that plaintiff ''had no rea::;uH t11
suspect the existence of such danger." (Appellanf::; Bril{
p. -!) ~one of the::::;e contentions are supported by tlw
record. \Vith respect to the claimed unguarded tra11
door opening, the evidence shows without di::::;pute that
the opening was guarded by a plywood sheet, approximately the size of a cross section of the corridor, ~et
in front of the trap door and thus giving notice that
passage was occluded. This was recognized in the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiff. ( T. 7) It wa~
also repeatedly testified to by plain tiff. ( T. Gl, 7-!, SU.
81, 82) Defendant Lon Rothey, and Martha Lynch, a
former employee of defendants whose testimony wa~
offered by the plaintiff, testified to the same effect.
(T. 21, 140)
\Yith respect to the claim of an unlit passageway,
there was uncontradicted testimony by defendant Lon
Rothey that there were overhead fluorescent lights above
the trap door. (T. 24) Plaintiff's witness, Gary Nelson.
testified that it was not dark in the passageway and that
the h.'itchen was alwavs real well lighted. (T. 37) He
nt>ver had any diffic~lty getting through the corridor
even with the partition up. (T. -!5) The kitchen end

9
\\(•uld lw lig-htL'd uy light from tltt~ kitdtl'll. (T ..!()) Plain;i1'!":-i '' 1tm•ss Brown te::;tified that he ha<l no difficulty
:.:•·l t inc:· down the <.'.orridor, although he ha<l no particular
1 ,., (llkdion of the light::;. ( T. 55)
Plaintiff himself testii1·d that thL' kiteltL'n wa::; well lit and that lights from the
io<'111;-; on l'itlH·r end of the corridor shown down the corr:do r. ( T. 73) Although he ha<l no recollection of lights
11 tlt1· pa:::-sagt>way, (T. 7-l) he had no difficulty in seeing
al11n.g the hall. (T. 80)
1

\\"ith rL•spect to plaintiff's daim that there were no
,.;,;us or warning devices, there was clear and pm;itive
~timony uy defendant Rothey and by his employee
:-;[i;·nrnod that there were warning lights in place at
tlt\'1· en<l of the corridor, and that there were "Employees Only'' signs at the en<l of the corridor, all of
"' hid1 ·were in place and readily visible on the evening
Jf the aeeident. ( 1'. 21, 22, 23, 181, 182, 183, Exs. 1, 2)
_\lthonglt the witness Nelson testified that he never
ol1:'erYed signs or warning lights (T. 36, 46) he would
Lilt dL·ny that sud1 warning8 were present and admitted
that tht>y could have been present without his having
ul1:'Prwu them. (T. 47) Likewise, the plaintiff, although
l1:l\ ing no re<.'.ollection of seeing the warning signs or
:lashing colored lights, (T. 61, 73) readily admitted on
('I u:':-; px.arnination that such signs and flashing lights
111i1-d1t haYe been in place without his having observed or
rL·c·alled them. ( T. 80, 85)
·I

••

1

1

Counsel's a8sertion that plaintiff had no reason to
~us1wct danger must have been made with tongue in
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cheek. The record is replete with testimony of a convi·rsation between plaintiff and defendants' then employ\'(·,
Martha Lynch, regarding a warning of a trap door in tli"
corridor. Again, in his opening statement to the jun.
counsel for the plaintiff adverted to this fact. (T. Gi
Plaintiff himself testified that Mrs. Lynch said, ··r may
have a trap door up," (T. GO, 63) Elsewhere, he testifir.d
that she said, "There may be a trap door," (T. 73) and
"I may have the trap door open." (T. 76) On cro~~
examination, when his attention was called to his testi
mony on deposition, wherein he testified that .Mrs. Lync·l1
said, ''I'll have a trap door up," he admitted that he wa~
not certain whether she said, "I will," or "I may" have a
trap door up. (T. 77) That he was conscious of th1
danger of a trap door is illustrated by his own adrni::;::;ion
as follows:
··Q. Now as you proceeded up that passagL·way.
were yoii conscious of this injunction tlial

there might be a trap door up?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what, if anything, did you do as a re:::ult
thereof?

A.

I was watching to see where I was goinr
and I moved the board to see if it U"as !1thind there, and it was." (T. 7-±) (Emphasi~
ours)

Mrs. LYnch's testimony was to the effect that she told
him the trap door was there and that it was dangerou~.
( T. U-0) According to the uncontradicted evidence of
two of defendants' employees, plaintiff said after the

11

·""1d1·11t that !iv l'dt "foofo;h" and "ernbarra::s:sed'' at hav11.: i'alll'lt in tlte trap door al'h·r having been warned
:1ll<i\I
· t 11~ preSl'lll'.l', ('I'. 1'~",
~u
1uu".I:')
ln :-;upport of his claim that the evidence would
-1tppnrt a finding of wilful misconduct upon the part

,,\ d\·LPndanb, plaintiff relies principally upon the A.L.l.
f,' .,/<1!1111c11t uf tlw Law uf Torts '2<.l, f::Jcction 500. This
:-1l't1011, lto\\'cYer, refers to "reckle:s:s disregard of safety''
1atlt1·r t lm11 "wilful misconduct.'' ln a :scope note pre,., di Hg tlus :section, the authors explain that the distinc:101, lict\n:en reckless and merely negligent misconduct
'·' made comparatively unimportant in the Restatement
-1Hl'I' the Institute adopts the view that a possessor of
iand o\\ es the same duty of care to a known trespasser
01 li('l'n:see a:s he would owe to a busine:ss invitee. That
:-:l'opt· note reads as follows:
"~eope Note: The distinction between reckless
arnl mt>rely negligent misconduct is made comparatively unimportant in the Restatement of this
.-;ubject, with respect to the duties of a possessor
of land to those coming onto the premises, by
tli1· fact that the Institute has adopted the view
that a posses8or of land owes the 8ame duty of
rnrd'ul action toward a known trespasser or a lic·1·n::sP1.' a8 he would owe had the same situation
arisen in a plaee in whieh both he and the trespa:-::-:Pr or licensee had an equal right or privilege
or ah:-:eneP of right or privilege to he. (See §336)
I l<rn-Pw'r, there an' many jurisdictions in the
l'nitPd StatPs whPre a possPssor of land has lwen
~aid to be liable to a known trespasser or gratuiton;:; lieensPe only if he has been !:,'1lilty of 'wanton,'
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'wilful,' or 'reckle::;s' mi::;con<luct toward the
passer or licensee."

111

..,_

:::;ection 500 was designed primarily to take care of thi"'
jurisdictions where a lesser standard of care i8 n·quin·d
of a possessor or owner of land toward a known tlhpasser or licensee than to a business invitee. rrhi8 would
appear to be of no importance in l:-tah, where thi:s eourt
has previously held that there is a duty to warn a kno11 11
trespasser of a danger of which the owner has knowledlrtJ 1.
and has reason to believe the plaintiff will not di:scover.
M.artin v. Jones, 122 Ut. 597, 253 P.2d 359. In that cast:.
this court adopted the rule of Section 337 of the Hestatement of the Law of Torts. In view of the fact that
Utah has adopted a rule of due care toward known trespassers, and in view of the further fact that the trial
judge treated the plaintiff as ·a business invitee in thi~
case, ruling out defendants' claims of trespasser or licensee, there was no occasion for application by th~
court of the rule of Section 500.
Moreover, that section in itself provides no preci~1·
definition of ''reckless disregard of safety" much les~
"wilful misconduct." It does indicate, however, that the
risk "is substantially greater than that which is necessanto make his conduct negligence." In this ca::;e, there wa~
a very serious question as to whether defendants wer~
even guilty of negligence, conceding arguendo, that plaintiff was an invitee whose presence should have been
anticipated at the place where the accident occurred.
There can be no doubt that defendants had taken some
precautions to make the passageway safe by the use of
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, :11 111 u:..: l 1gli b aml :-;ign::; and tl1L· L' rl'dion of a lmrrit<tde.
1 11111Td1ng that a jury might iind that these precau,1111:- \1 l·n· not rl'a::;onable or adequate under the circum,!.111tT:', it is difficult to ::;ee uvon what ground a jury
111i·l ;'iml that defendant::; were wholly unmindful or
, 111qilt h·ly 1ndiffl'l'l'nt to the ::;afety of user::; of the pa::;::;"~1·11

a:

·i11·\1 :- 11

of the vreeaution::; which the evidence
itl1out di:-01rnte had been taken.
ill

YiL•\\'

l'lallltit'f relies heavily upon the \\'a::;hington ea::;e
1 1,,,, /1111 c. 8ulu11w11, 287 P.:2d 7:21. This is the only

i1it'l1 our researth disclose::; wherein a pos::;essor of
ia11d lia:- IJ1'L'l1 held liable upon the grounds of wilful
1 1i~1·111J(lll<·t.
lt may be noted parenthetically that there
. :111 1·:\11·11:.:ive annotation in GG ALR :2d, conuuencing at
1 .1~1· ;;;;:i. on the subject of falls into stairways, trap
il.111r:-, 1·k. Although this annotation occupies some one
'1il111in1il L><WL'ti there is not a sino-le case therein cited
b
'
b
.. 1· n·p111'ted wherein the theory of recovery was based
ltjlllll \\ ilfnl misconduct. rrhe only theory relied upon by
:111.\· ol' thL· plaintiff::; in the cases there reported, other
tl1a11 1wo-li"·pm·v
wa::; that in a cou1)le of cases plaintiffs
r-"'
r
'
1"ii1·d upon ··::;afe place" statutes.
g,. that a::; it may, the Gn·etan case is ::;o different
11 1t.-- fact::; from the case at bar as to be of no persuasive
.tllthorit: in this case. The principal finding of fact of
t 111 trial vonrt in that case was finding YIII, as follows:
.. \'I I I. Dd<>ndanb admit in thPir Anl"W<'r and the
l '(>mt l'ind8 that tlw PXC'avation at thf' time in
i:-;:-w· wn:.: op<>n and lmrovpn•d, irithout signi'.i,
ii.r1/1fs 11r 91wrds 11ro1111d it. and the Court furtlwr
l'iud:-: from the evidt.•nvl' that dcfe11da11ti'.i mode no
;t:-1· \

1
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effort• tu • warn •lJl·a·intiffs
the• G·nl)(•t·.
.
•
• '
<
~, (Jl a1,
other t:nants of theu· mtentton to PxeaYat(· ,,'
of the fact that the excavation had aetualfr Ii\·,
started. rfhe
COUrt
further finds that dejc;li/ 1/11/.L
•
•
gr:ve n~ instructwf!s to George icith ref;ard .
signs, lzghts, warn1.ngs or other safef;1wrds "' .
that no such safeguards u·cre in fact takeu. IJ
fendants had pro·vided no lighting i11 the <ii· 11 , /.i
area and no light u:as providc.d from u11fs 11 i.
sources. At the time plaintiff wife ~ustai1wd Ji,
fall, the back yard generally and the place uf en 1.
vation particularly were in complete darkiu·:~,. ai 1,,
the plaintiffs did not knu1r and had 1w rca.-01 1 ;
know of the existence of the exca1;atio11.·· (Eu'
phasis ours)
The italicized portions of the above quote readily de11w 1,
strate the differences between the facts in the Grt>etm
case and in the case at bar.
The other case heavily relied upon by plaintiff 1~
Busy Bee Buffet v. Ferrell, (Ariz.) 310 P.2d 817 Tlwi
was not a case of reckless or wilful misconduct at all.
Plaintiff proceeded against two separate defendant!
upon the grounds of negligence, and a conflict aro~t
between the two defendants concerning primary and
secondary liability. One defendant had beeen guilty 01
active negligence in creating a danger to the plain·
tiff. The other defendant was guilty of merely pa~~in
or static negligence in failing to discover or remove th
danger. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the
defendant who was merely passively negligent was en·
titled to indemnity from the defendant whose negligenl'1
was active. Said the court:
"* * * \Ve believP "'"' should now discuss briefh
the difference between the character and kind 111
0

1
,
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11,.;..d i;.•y1H·1· or th1· Huffl't and that of Pastis. The
t1·rn1 'di l"t'n1•JHT in kind and eharadt>r' lwtwPell
1li1· 111·glig-1·11cP or thP Buffd and Pa:-:ti:-: lllust not

IJ\' 1·1'11l'u:-1·d ,,·itlt \·u1u1mratin· 11Pgligt•nce' or '<le~T1·1·:--

1Jf m·gligt·iwt•.'"

• • •

"\\'1· 1"i11stntl' thP Y\•rdiet as n•rHl\'rPd as a finding
!1.' tli1· .inr>· that lioth the lfoffd w1d Pastis w1·n·
11• .11/i1}"J1f and both wen• liahh· to Ft•JTPll in tlw
1·1i1 I ;111w1111t of tlw Yl'rdiet, and that Pastis wa.-;
pri11wril>· Iiahl(~ and tht• Buffrt s\•(·ondarily liahh·,
and tliat the· Buffot was Pntitlt'd to intlPnmity as
again ..;t Pastis.'' (Ernphasis ours)

!'Iii:- i:-; \':--~wntially the same type of case and involve::;

ti1•·

,a1111·

principal as wm; recognized by this court on

-1111tln1 i'ads in the case of Salt Lake City u. 8chuhach,
111,

I :. :.!li!i, 1S9 P.2d 149.

:no,

ThL· l 'tah cases of Wood v. Taylor, 8 Ut.2d
332
1'.~d :21.-l; /'1 rg11.':ioll c. Ju11gsma, 10 Ut.2d 179, 350 P.2d

arnl State l". Berchtold, 11 "Gt.2d 208, 357 P.2d 183,
<rn· not hl'lpful here. All of them are automobile cases
-tll-t;

v. Taylor was
d(•('idl'd nnd('l' the Idaho guest ,statute, and tlw issue was
'-1 hdlt1·r thP defendant was guilty of "reckless disregard"
for plaintiff's safety within the meaning of the Idaho
la\\. ~tat\• v. B\•rehtold was a crim.inal case. The case
,,t· Lorsui1 1·. Calder's Park Cu., 5.f. Ut. 325, 180 P. 599,
<l;~u quotl·d hy plaintiff, wa:s decided on a negligence or
nui:--nn1·1• tlwory and not upon a theory of reckless or
'>' i If 1d 111 i :--•·on<lnet. Tlw otlwr C'asl's c·i t(:ld and relif'<l upon
Ii~ 1ilaini ff. n<llll\'ly, Senner c. Da11e1wld, (Ore.), 7 P.2d
~-t\J: C/1(11/(c r. Lmcry's Inc., :2-t Cal. Rptr. 209, 3H P.2d
\1·ltoll~- Jiffnent on their facts. \Vood

Hi

185; and Rossiter v. Moure ' (\Vash.) ' 370 p ·-U
.y.1 ·»ti.
-J d!1
all negligence cases, sii11ply holding that the t·vidL·I!,,,
of negligence in the particular case was sufiirn·nt ti
warrant a jury finding to that effect. These cas1._'s Ju ai.
support plaintiff's contentions here.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
WAS UNTIMELY IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY AXD
BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE.

As we have heretofore noted, the plaintiff toll!·
menced this action on a theory of negligence. All Ji~.
covery proceedings were conducted upon the ua::;is 111
that theory. The theory was re-asserted at the pretna1.
At the time of pretrial, all discovery proceeding::; ha11
been completed and plaintiff's counsel then had availaoi1
to him, and knowledge of, all of the evidence that wa~
available to prove his case. In all fairness to the dtfendants, they should have been advised at that time ii
plaintiff intended to rely upon any theory of wiliu'.
misconduct or any theory other than those already st1
forth in the pleadings and pretrial order. Even at th1·
outset of the trial, plaintiff's counsel did not advise tht
court of his intention to seek an amendment to his cow·
plaint. Cross examination of plaintiff's witnesses at
trial was conducted on the assumption that the c~ 1
was being tried on a negligence theory.
Had the plaintiff's motion been granted it would haw
been necessary for defendants to amend their answer and
to allege the defens es set forth in Section 503 of th"
Restatement of Torts 2d. It would also have been nece~·
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-: 11 .. l 11' d1·1·1·11dants to st•t·k a eontimuuiee to agam
, ,.\ 11·11 1IL(' nwt t1·r \\·ith all witlll':"St•s and to dett>n11ine
:1·.t ;,dd1tio11al 1·\·idt·rn·t· \\ould have to lw offered in
.. ,[, ,. t1l 1111•\·t thP new theory,
. All of this would eertainlv.
;1" i1t!l·1 l1·1·l·d \Yith a "slH'l'UY and i1wxpensive" trial of
I"· :le-". 11 !1 iclt is mH· of thl' puq)()Sl'S to be served by tlw
'.;II: [(Ull':". lfo/(· 1, C.R.().P.
11 111ak1ng his motion, eounst•l for the plaintiff of,, d 1111 ,·xplanation or justifieation for his tardiness
.11,,l. 111d1·1·d, lw eould have had none. The obvious pur,, "' · "1· t l1l' uianeuv<'r was to seek hy surprist' to <lt>lH'ive
, 11·11tla11t:- of one of the defenst·s upon whieh they most
.-i:,H1;. ;l~ n·liPd, nanwly: negligt'nee upon the part of
! .. plainti!T. Jn fad, under the holdings of this court
,., A Jl·I!' , • i"ill<Jll', lHl L'.t. 522, 229 P.2d Si-±; Tempo;t 1:.
/!1c/1i111lsu11, .-> l"t.2d 17-t, 299 P.2d 124-; Wood i:. Wood,
"' l 't.:2d :27!J, :l:l3 P.:2d G:30; JI ('!try u. H' ashiki CluJJ, Inc.,
1 l l 1.:211 i:;~, :l:->5 P.2d 973; and 1Vhitma11 1:. W. 1'. Grant
! •) .. 1li 1·t .:2<1 ~ 1, :l~J;J P.:2d 918, it is difficult to see how
1 la,11tifl' <·onltl havP avoidPd a holding as a matter of law
1i1a1 ltl' ,,·as guilty of contributory negligence.
l'lainti!Ts motion for leave to amend must be justi; 11 d. 1f at a 11, urnlPr tlw provisions of part ( b) of Rule
,."1. { .H.( '.!>. This provides, insofar as material here, as
I

J

'l 1(I\\' :-i :

.\11ll'rnhw·nts to Conform to the EvideneP.\\'l1t<11 issrn•s not raisPd hy tlH' plt>adings arf' tried
i!I/ ,. , J,,.r·ss or i111JJ[i('(l co11sl'nf of the partiPs, they
:-l1all i,,. t n·at(•d in all rPSJH'<·ts as if tlwy had been
rai:-1·d in tlw plt·mling:-. " "' " If evidence is ob-

"I !11
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jL·_cte_d to a~ the trial on tlw ground that it 1 ~ 1,,,
w1thm the rnsues rna~e by the pl<>ading:..:, th(· ,. 11 \: .
may allow the pleadmgs to be amendPd \\'hPn ,,
presentation of the merits of the adion will i.
su~served thereby and the objecting party foil.-,
satisfy the court that the admission of :..:ul'] 1 , \
de~ce would pn•judice him in maintaining L.
act1011 or defense upon the merit::s. • " *'' 1 J'·
phasis ours)
"
\Ve have no lJ.Uarrel with the general prupo:-; 1111 ,,
asserted by the plaintiff, and the authorities cited ..
support thereof, to the effect that amendments shall !·
freely allmved to "conform the pleading to the evi<lem1"
"to accomplish substantial justice'' ''when the intere~t 1.1:
the adverse party will not be unfairly prejudiced," 1J1.
However, that is not this case. There were no i$~\JI.·
tried in this case "by express or implied consent" of tl1·
parties other than those defined in the pleadings a111:
the pretrial order. All of the evidence offerd by tL1
plaintiff was relevant to the issues of negligence <m'.
contributory negligence. Any evidence of wilful miseon·
duct, if any such had been available to the plaintiff.
would have been objected to as irrelevant, innnater~al.
and beyond the issues of the case. By its plain langual:'1
the provisions of Rule 15 (b) are not applicable here..t
noted in 3 Moore's F!!deral Practice 997:
"It has been held, however, that a court has pow1
to reject an amPndnwnt off Pred at or aftN tna
1
purportt>dl~· to eonfo11n to PYidenee, if the oPJl1• '
ing party will be prejudiced thereby, or the tna
unduly
. delaved."
.
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11.\ tlti:-: <'Ollrt Ill fll11ckl111111 1 . •'\111·!!1ro1· 1 •
,I!.-,~. :_>:II l'.:2d -i.;1:l, thl p11rpo:-:1• of p]Pading:-: und\'J'
1., I" \,, ··,,:i\·1· tlH· oppo:-:ing party fair noti<'I' of th1·
::,:: 11 · 1 ;1,i:-: l1r ground:-: ol' tlH· (']aim." \\'(' abo invitl'
11 ·It !" tlw ln11gung1• of' thi:-: c·oHrt in th1• ea:-:1' of
,

,,,,1

i1d (111!

1

1

\,. ,.,,i1/
1 ..

1·r1r111, ,._, l ·11i()11 J>roJJ.

'd , .

~"-Ii

&: ('as. Co. r. Tlw111psu11,

l'.:2d :2-l-!l, ,,·Ji1·n· th1· eourt :-:aid:

.. \,>111 ,; l1,.;1<1111li11.!: all ol' onr 1•t'f'ort:-: to dimi11at1·
1., l1ni,-;lii1i(·c- a11d lilH·rnliz1· proePdl!n', w1· rnu:-:t
11 1 11 J,,,,, c-i_!. dtt ol' th1· c·ardina] pri1wipl1· that undc·r
··Iii :--\ :-:t1·111 ol' .iu:-:tic·I', if an i:-::-:\11' i:-: to hi' tril'cl
::11 I :1 :1:111~ ':-:right:-: 1·orn·IHdPd \\ith n·:-:1H·l't tlll'n·111. i1 11111,f /11/{'1 lllific1· fllt'/'t'IJj (Ill(/(/// OjJjJO/'fllll1
' 11111 f it.
This i:-: n•1·01-,rniz1•d in Hui<' l;)(h)
1
• 1i1·l1 1·1·<'it(':-: tl1at S\\('h lihnal arn1•1Hl111l'nts ;-;hall
111· :1ll1r1\(•d if th1• i;-;:-:rn· i;-; tril·cl 'hy 1•xpn•:-::-: or i1111·l:1,,] 1·1>11:-:(•nt of th1• partil':-:.' It d1w;-; not appPar
: l1<1l i lwn' \1·a;-; a11.Y :-'U('h 1·011:-:1·11t to try th1• i;-;:-:111·
11' t '.i(' Yalw· of' thi;-; huilding..... n, (Emphasis
1

Ollf::')

1[_,,,

q1111110:-:

Ii(']('

';1,1· of 'l1111lor
l'.:.'.d ~19:
•• 1 t i.-...

1.

is th1· languag1• of this eourt in the
/.,'. JI. Ruyle Curp., 1 l't.:2d li5, 26-1

om 111·1r rull·s shoul1l lw •Jill<'rally

1nt1· that

1-.111:--fr111·d· to s1·1·11n• a ·,j11:-:t •"' • d1•t1·r111ination of
ad ion' l>11t tl11·~- do not J'(•pn·;-;l'nt a 0111•-way
-! 11·1·t <lll\n1 \1·hiC'h hut 0111· litigant Illa~- trav"I.
Tl1 .. rnl1·s allow 10(·1·0Jl10ti011 in hoth din·l'tion:-: hy
;111 111t1·n""t1•d trav1•l('J'.". 'l'h1·y allow plaintiffs eon:--id1·ralil(• latitudl' in pll·<Hling- arnl proof, to tlw
1 11int 11·lt1·n· :-:011tl' IH'opl<· ha\"!' 1•xpn•;-;;-;1•d th1· opini1111 1l1at 1·ar<'ll :-:s ](•gal (']'af't:-:rnan:-:hip ha:-: !Jl'Pll
i11Yil«d ratlil·I' than di:-:1·011rn.!:l'd. B1• that as it
•:1:1:-, 11 1/1 (1 111la11l 11111sf !"· 1Yf1·11dcd cury rl'asun-

,.., , r:·

1

1

:.JI

·(J;ble opzwrt1wity to prepare his case 1111d to 111 ,
an °:dversar.1/.~ claims. Al:so he nwst ur jJ/'olt c; ..
~tgaznst ~·1irp!·1sc a11d uc assured CfJIWl UJ!JJur/,,,
ity (~nd jaczl1ty to present a11d prucc co1111/1r ci,,
tentwns, - df:w unilateral justiee and in.itbiir·
would result suffici<>nt tu rai::se :wrious doubt~ :i·
to constitutional due proces::s guarankes.'' ( t-: 111
phasis ours)
The language of the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap)ll«ti·
in the case of Sims i.:. Andre1rs, 118 F.:Zd 803 is imrti1 11
larly pertinent here:
''It is ordinarily within the sound di::scretion of ::1•
trial court to permit an amendment to confur1
to the proof where evidence has been intro<lut·1.,'.
without objection as to facts not presented, .I!
insufficiently presented, by the pleadings. Th,
right to amend pleadings to conform to the Jll'U1•
proceeds upon the theory that by such amend11H·11:
the pleadings are brought in line with the actua1
issues upon which the case was tried, even thou~!
such issues were not stated in the pleading~ a'
originally drawn. In such case it is the duty of th"
court, after the evidence upon the supposed is~u·
has been introduced without objection, to perrni:
the amendment. . . . This rule, hou;crcr, duc.s 1w:
authorize such an amendment 1ncrely bccau8c cc·
dence which is competrnt and 11iaterial upo11 fir

issitcs created by the pleadings incidentally fr/Iii·
to pru'i.:e another fact 11ut il·ithin the issues i11 111
case." (Emphasis ours)

See also the languagP of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in the case of 8rars, Roebuck & Co. r. M~r:
henkc, 121 F.2d 598, where a plaintiff, after having trite
his case on a negligence theory attempted to anll'Ill'
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I \I

11wl11d1· a thl·ory of bread1 of warranty. Haid the
\l

J"1 :

"l:otli pll·adings and findings an• t•ntireh con:--ic-t\·llt \\·ith tlH• position nmintaim•d by the ·appd11·1· in hi=- prineipal brief that 'the aetion is not one
l or an i111plie<l \\'arranty ... but tht> c0111plaint and
[1ndi11µ:;-; of fact ... presPn t a case of nt>gligPIH'l' •
1·t1·. and altogPtht•r ineonsi:.;tPnt with tlw tlworv
111' lial1ility for br<>aeh of an i111pliP<l warranty ad\ a11(·\·d in tlw supplementary brief. This is not
a \'a.-.:1• in whieh issues not raised hy tht> plt>adings
\\1·r(• tried by tht> 'expres.s or impli(•d consPnt of
t lw part i(•s · arnl Hule 15 ( b) ... ha.s tlH•rpfon• no
appli<·ation. The• case was tried as one for nPglig·(·!l<'<' in a<'conlancP with the issues made by the
plPadings.
"\\.h('tlwr tht• evidence offered would have supJ>lirh·d a j11<lg11wnt for breach of an implied warranty lmsPd upon other plt>adings and findings WP
w·P<l not now d<>tennine. The present action must
h treatl'<l as one for nPglig<'n<'.P only. lt is there! )I"\' umu•<·\·ssary to consider tlw argm1u•nt of eouns\•l with rPfert>nce to the right of an infant to
J'\'('1)\'1•r upon an i111plie<l warranty made to hi::;
pan•nts."
~('\·

also tht· language of Hay ·z:. Nance, 119 F.Supp.

~ li:J:

".\ t tlw Pn•-trial t•onf<.n•nc·P, during tht• opPning
c-tatPttH•nt of tlw dPf Pndant and through tlw trial,
t 111· nttornPY for thP dPfrndant rPfrrn•d to thret'
addition al <lPfrm;p:-; othN than thm:p plPaded: (a)
n"g-lig-PTl<'P of plaintiff's hrn.;hand (h) plaintiff's
<·<•n,.;11111ption of liquor and (c) suddPn PmPrgPncy,
\\ lii<·lt ha<1 not pr<'vionsly lw<'n raisrd in the> pleading-:-: and to sueh injPction into the case, proper

22
objection wm; ma<le by eounsel for thP plaintill
Moreover, proof establishing sueh <lefrnsPs \\.:
irnm~fieie~t. '.l'herefore l find that, t•vc•n \\ itli 11'
~mehoratmg mfluence of Hule 13 ( b) ... tlH· l'<iur:
18 precluded from eonsidPring tht>se <ldt>n:-;i·~
For Hule 15(b) has no application unless isi;u 1.:
not raised by the pleadings are tried with th;.
express or implied eonsent of the parties ... , ai 1, 1
where evidence has been admitted over ohjPttii.!
and the pleadings have not been amended, 11 ,
amendment can be implied. . . . And, of eom~·
there must be at least proofs to support the l'iud
ings if there is no underlying pleading."
1

1

,

See also the language of the Supreme Court of Col11rado in the case of Clemann v. Bandinierc, 259 P.2d Gl-1.

616:

''Amendments such as here allowed should !J,
granted after the close of the evidence only i1
cases where no reasonable doubt remains tha:
the issue raised by the amendment has been in
tentionally and actually tried. It is not enou~ 1
that some evidence has been received germane t
the issue sought to be raised."
Pursuant to Rule 16, the court conducted a pretria.
which specifically limited the issues for trial, and pn·
vided that no amendments to the pleadings be perrnittt>C
except '•for good cause shown." No good cause w~
shov.'11, or even attempted to be shown by counsel fo1
plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing considerations, it canmr
be said that the trial judge abused his discretion in deny
ing plaintiff's untimely motion for leave to amend.

I 11d1·r 1'()i11t 111 01' hi~ 1,ri1·f, plaintiff :'l'l'k:.; to
11.tk 11111:-<t1H·1· \\·1th wilful rni~1·01Hlul't. Ill' has eitl'd
, 1,, ;:11:l111rity
for thi:-: proposition, a;-'~Ullwdly for thl'
.. ;1,,111 that tlt1·n· is nonl'. ln th1· absl'IH'l' of supporting
:11Jtl11111t:- !'or plaintiff'~ po~ition, Wl' Sl'P no nl'L'<l to
11<'!11·i11:-::ak tli1· ol>Yious-that nui:-:am·p an<l wilful rnis·1i11il11t·: an· 1·ntin·ly uifft:l'l'nt ('()Jl('(•pt~, with uiffrring
"..:" 1 1111·id1·11b and eoBsl'![lll'lH't•s.
\Y 1· make this obsl'r\"a1 11. 111 ii.'
:-:u that the c·ourt uiay know that Wl' <lo not,
1.1 ,.il1·111·1·, a1·quiesee in plaintiff's eontPntion.
•

1

COXCLVSlOX
1·1t~·n· \nu; no e\'iuence in the record whieh would
'"l'['\llt 1l rinding of wilful rniseonduet upon tht· part
"' tlt1• d1·f1·1Hla11t. Plaintiff's motion for leave to anwnd
.1 :1:- u11tirn1·ly fih·d and the court did not abuse its dis' r1·t 11111 in d1·11yi11g th1· motion. The judgrnl'nt of the trial
1·1111rt :-lwuld be affirmed.
H1•sp1•rtfully sulnnittPd,
CHHI8TI•:~SEX A~D .H~XSE~

Attorneys for defendants and
respondents
1~U3 ContinPntal Bank Building
Salt Lake City, l"tah

